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Abstract
The use of  derivatives  by Indian banks has  increased  in  the recent  past.  Derivatives  are
complicated  assets,  and  many  characteristics  of  these  relatively  new  assets  have  been
evolving day by day. The fast growth of bank involvement in derivative markets has raised
concerns about the potential hazards of this activity. On the flipside, certain characteristics of
derivatives make them highly useful in hedging risks. It is a well-known fact that derivative
activity is concentrated among relatively larger banks. However, very little is known about
other factors that govern the decisions regarding derivative usage by banks. In theory, an
exposure  of  bank  to  interest  rate  risk  should  impact  the  derivative  transaction  volume.
Furthermore, the use of derivative will vary according to bank capital, bank size and its use of
alternatives  to hedge.  The paper uses the financial  characteristics  of banks those trade in
derivatives and banks those do not trade in derivatives ,  by using bank level data for 46
Indian Scheduled Commercial  banks for the year 2013. A Tobit Model is used to analyse
censored data on notional amount of derivative use and its relationship with various financial
characteristics of banks. These financial characteristics include bank size, capital adequacy,
exposure to credit and interest rate risk, profitability and liquidity. We find that derivative
user  banks have higher  liquidity,  lower interest  margins,  are  larger. Additionally,  there  is
evidence in support of the “assurance” capital hypothesis highlighting the use of derivatives
by large well capitalised banks. The larger banks exposed with lower interest margins and
higher capital ratios are more likely to use derivatives to hedge their interest rate risk. Using
an augmented market model, we further calculate systematic risk exposure of banks for the
year  2013  and  test  whether  usage  of  derivatives  and  interest  rate  derivatives  contribute
towards an aggravation in the systematic risk exposure of banks. The results point towards a
significant  decrease  in  exchange  rate  riskiness  using  derivatives  as  well  as  a  significant
decline in the long term interest risk as well. It implies and motivates banks to indulge in
derivative trading, as the systemic risk do not seem to be potentially aggravated by using
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them.  Nevertheless,  derivative  activity  is  be  concentrated  among  well  capitalised  banks
which can safely manage risks.
Keywords: derivatives , systematic risk, hedging, exchange rate exposure, interest rate risk
1. Introduction
Banks  often  need  a  way to  manage  interest  rate  risk  without  additional  capital  on  their
balance  sheet.  Financial  derivatives  seem to  be  a  relatively  common  solution.  Usage  of
derivatives by Indian Banks has grown immensely in the past few years and it is expected to
increase in the years to come, as they leverage their products and focus more on cross selling.
Derivatives  are  an  effective  risk  management  tool  for  both  financial  and  non-financial
companies. They effectively transfer financial risks borne by a risk averse party to another
who is willing to bear the attached risk . Participants are either market makers or users. A user
engages in a transaction to manage an underlying risk whereas a market maker provides a
platform for users to participate in these transactions. Market maker offers continuous bid and
offer prices and hence makes the market. A market maker might not necessary have a risk to
transfer  but  is  necessary  for  a  derivative  transaction.  Typically  users  participate  in  a
derivative transaction to reduce or eliminate a determined risk on a continuing basis until the
expiry of the underlying contract. They are also used to transform the risk exposure of the
party as per RBI guidelines.  Market makers  act  as counter parties to every contract  with
participating users and among themselves. 
RBI has currently permitted usage of following derivative instruments by banks:
Interest rate derivatives – Interest Rate Swaps(IRS), Forward Rate Agreements (FRA), and
Interest Rate Futures
Foreign Currency derivatives – Foreign Currency Forwards, Currency Swaps and Currency
Options
Generally banks use FRA/ IRS to hedge the risk borne by them due to variations in interest
rates due to an item of asset or liability in their balance sheet. They also use interest rate
futures  to  hedge  risk  on  their  investments  in  government  securities  in  AFS  and  HFT
portfolios.
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1.1 Derivatives Users in India
The use of derivatives by the Indian banks has seen a tremendous rise in the past 15 years.
Derivatives trading for banks are an effective risk management tool by transferring financial
risks borne by a risk averse party to another who is willing and better prepared to bear the
risk. The Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Bill, 2006 has legalised all derivatives trading
where at least one of the parties in a transaction is a RBI regulated entity.
The interest rate deregulation coupled with operational elasticity for Indian banking sector
has  fuelled  the  need  for  banks  to  hedge  against  any  risk  arising  out  of  interest  rate
fluctuations.  An immediate  short  term impact  would be the thinning or expanding of net
interest margins  The fluctuation in interest rates causes changes in  market value of assets as
well.
In view of the interest rate risk as well as a string of other risks faced by the banks, they need
to safeguard themselves from any kind of unexpected future events which might strain their
profit levels. Therefore banks use derivatives as users and dealers to mitigate the risk levels.
As users they will hedge against any unanticipated changes in interest rates or even foreign
exchange rates with use of derivative products. As another strategy they could even speculate
the  movements  of  the  economic  variables  in  future  and enter  into  derivative  market.  As
dealers, larger banks may provide over the counter (OTC) derivative products to other banks
or non financial firms.
However  financial  users  have  not  extensively  used  exchange  traded  derivatives.  Their
contribution to total value of NSE trades has been far lesser than retail investors. However,
financial institutions have used OTC fixed income instruments to manage their risk. Market
for interest rate derivatives has largely seen banks as users with state-owned banks showing
little  interest.  MNCs and  large  corporations  are  keen on currency derivatives  and  swaps
majorly bought from banks. This lack of interest in derivative markets is primarily due to the.
However banks are again regulated from having substantial exposure to equity markets and
as per the RBI directive ,which prevents banks from using derivatives for anything more than
hedging existing  positions  in  spot  markets  Hence  there  ares  less  incentives  for  banks in
trading in derivatives. With the opening of economy the significance of risk administration in
banking has happened to central significance. In India, financial institutions have not been
primary users of exchange-traded derivatives so far, and their contribution to total NSE as on
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October 2005 was less than 8% (Asani Sarkar,2005).  It  has been pointed out in previous
studies  that  transactions  between banks dominate  the market  for  interest  rate  derivatives,
while presence of state-owned banks remains small(Chitale, 2003).
 Table 1 shows the growth of the derivative transactions over the last 15 years. The total
number  of derivative  contracts  that  were traded in 2000-01 was 90850 in number which
increased to 795,751,261 in 2013-14. 
Table 1: Growth of derivative transactions over the last 15 years
Year Number of Contracts Total Turnover (inRs. billions) Average Daily Turnover (in Rs.
billions)
2013-14 795,751,261 229,788.02 1573.89
2012-13 1,131,467,418 315,330.04 1266.38
2011-12 1,205,045,464 313,497.32 1259.02
2010-11 1,034,212,062 292,482.21 1151.50
2009-10 679,293,922 176,636.64 723.92
2008-09 657,390,497 110,104.82 453.12
2007-08 425,013,200 130,904.78 521.53
2006-07 216,883,573 73,562.42 295.43
2005-06 157,619,271 48,241.74 192.20
2004-05 77,017,185 25,469.82 101.07
2003-04 56,886,776 21,306.10 83.88
2002-03 16,768,909 4398.62 17.52
2001-02 4,196,873 1019.26 4.10
2000-01 90,580 23.65 0.11
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of banks
For our analysis SBI and associates, Nationalised banks, Old Private banks and New Private
banks were chosen. 
1..2  Why would banks use derivatives?
In view of the above risks faced by the banks, they need to safeguard themselves from any
kind of unexpected future events which might strain their profit levels. Therefore banks use
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derivatives as users and dealers. As users theyl hedge against any unanticipated changes in
interest  rates  or even foreign  exchange rates  with use of  derivative  products.  As another
strategy they could even speculate the movements of these economic variables in future and
enter into derivative market. As dealers larger banks may provide over the counter (OTC)
derivative products to other banks or non financial firms.
1.3 Diversification
Banks  have  been  moving  away  from  their  traditional  business  activity  of  lending  and
deposits.  Early  studies  point  out  towards  the  growing  importance  of  “other  services”  in
commercial banks. The motivation for banks in participating in derivative market could be
two  fold.  One,  they  would  benefit  from  reducing  the  risk  exposure  to  their  customers,
secondly they could reduce their probability of financial instability.
Researchers have suggested that innovations in banking may lead to higher costs associated
with new products. As such derivative usage could imply higher costs. 
 
Only a handful of banks are dealers in the international market, rest of the banks are only end
users. This implies that they use derivatives to hedge against any unanticipated changes in the
economic environment. G´eczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) point out that banks need many
more incentives to hedge rather than just market imperfections.
Smith  and  Stulz  (1985)  argue  that  banks  which  have  a  high  probability  of  book  value
insolvency and are most likely to benefit from hedging and will therefore use derivatives.
Banks may also use derivatives to hedge against their credit risk exposure, if that be the case
there should be some relationship between the level  of credit  risk loan loss provisions to
derivative usage.
It has been found out that costs related with the level of bankruptcy are higher for firms
which are smaller in size(Gruber et al.,1977) implying a higher motivation for smaller banks
to  use  derivatives.  However  there  may  be  costs  associated  with  implementing  a  risk
management program which may discourage them from using derivatives. Booth et al. (1984)
indicate that smaller banks have to bear high costs of hiring expertise for an effective risk
management program.
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2. Review of literature
We find  abundant  literature,  largely  theoretical  on  the  usage  of  derivatives  by  financial
institutions.  One strand of  literature  supports  the  argument  that  the  use  of  derivatives  is
related to hedging (Smith& Stulz (1985),Duffee(1996)).The other strand argue that derivative
can be regarded as instruments that reform the risks in trading into manageable risks (Duffee
and  Zhou,2001). Kamau and Rwegasira (2014) study the extent to which multilateral banks
use currency derivatives.
The empirical literature related to the present study includes some of the new studies made in
this  regard.  Ashraf.et  al  (1997) examine the determinants  of the use of credit  derivatives
among  a  sample  of  336 large  US Bank holding  companies.  Yong  etal  (2005)  study the
disclosure practices among the Asia Pacific banks with respect to derivatives and conclude
that developed countries have higher levels of disclosure as compared to developing nations.
Broccardo et al (2014) analyse the extent of usage of derivatives by banks and also analyse
the difference between users and non users, the underlying motivations to use them.
Various researchers have identified bank specific balance sheet variable and hypothesise its
relationship with the use of derivatives. Prior research has also documented the importance of
size in banks’ use of futures (Koppenhaver, 1990), swaps (Koppenhaver, 1993). In general it
might be expected that larger banks may have may participate  in derivatives  indicating a
positive  relationship  between  derivative  usage  and  size  of  banks  Derivatives  reduce  the
likelihood of financial distress by decreasing the variability in firm value, thus reducing the
expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayers and and Smith, 1987).
Sinkey Carter (2000) provide similar evidence on the characteristics of banks that undertake
risk management  using derivatives  which indicates  that  smaller  banks are  more  likely to
hedge. On the other hand, some studies argue that large firms have more resources to set up a
hedging program and employ personnel with expertise in derivatives than do small firms and
hence are more likely to use derivatives (Hoyt, 1989; Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997); (Cummins et
al.  1997;  Cummins  et  al.,  2001).  In  line  with  the  scale  and  informational  economies
argument, Sinkey and Carter (2000) arguethat affiliated banks have access to the resources
necessary to be active derivative users. They find that affiliated banks are more likely to use
derivatives due to the existence of barriers to entry in banks’ derivatives activities. They also
argue that  banks that  generate  higher  profitability  from intermediation  are more  likely to
undertake  derivatives  hedging  programs  to  lock  in  profits,  while  those  with  lower
profitability are more likely to assume risks or speculate using derivatives.
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Merton and Bodie (1992) give an assurance capital hypothesis and document that capital acts
as a buffer to absorb shocks and acts as a cushion. This could in turn suggest a positive
relationship between derivative usage and capital.
Banks may also choose to invest in liquid assets rather than hedging, an on balance sheet risk
management  technique(Nance,  Smith  &  Smithson,  1993).  Liquid  assets  may  be  easily
converted into cash whenever a bank is in a difficult situation. Dividend  payout may also be
limited during difficult times. Together, these may be an alternative to hedging or derivative
participation and can be assuring to cover debt obligations.
There are direct and indirect costs arising out of financial distress. Law suits and related costs
can be considered direct costs. Indirect costs can have a lasting impact on ??. The companies,
when perceived to be unsound financially, will find it difficult to raise  capital. Potentially it
might result in foregoing a profitable venture. In this angle, derivatives which stabilise cash
flow of a company can be considered a substitute for equity capital.
Many researchers have been done in this  regard and they point towards a causal relation
between capital structure and derivatives usage. As said above if derivatives were used as a
substitute  of  equity  then  former  should  alleviate  the  pressure  on  a  company  using  high
leverage. Dolde (1996) and Love and Argawa (1997) have found the same. Mixed results
were reported by other researchers in this area >??.  
Variables that signify debt levels of a firm should have an impact on the derivatives usage.
Studies in the past have also proved the same. Froot et al. (1993) have found that usage of
derivatives will lower prospect of a financial distress for a given debt ratio. Debt ratio plays a
significant  role  in  ascertaining  quantum of  derivatives  usage.  Studies  have  indicated  that
there is a positive relationship between financial distress and usage of derivatives. Financial
distress is more probable when leverage increases and interest coverage ratio is reduced. In
such a scenario hedging with derivatives is advisable as it can stabilise the cash flows and
maintain the value of the company. Winata and Heaney (2005) also support the view that
there is a causal relation between debt level and derivatives usage. 
Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences in financial characteristics
of banking organizations that use derivatives relative to those that do not use derivatives.
They find that banks that use derivatives grow their business-loan portfolio faster than banks
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that do not use derivatives. Purnanandam (2004) also reports that the derivative users make
more C&I loans than non-users.
In addition to the above mentioned factors, Geczy et al. (1997), suggest that foreign exchange
risk is an important determinant to compel banks to enter into the derivative market.With the
globalisation of the Indian economy banks face increased level of exchange rate exposure as
well.
A bank’s profit takes a hit when there are adverse movements in interest rates.  In the current
volatile environment interest rates changes are hard to predict. In the long run interest rate
change affects bank’s assets, liabilities and in turn their net worth. Hence it is always prudent
to have a risk management mechanism in place. Banks resort to interest rate derivatives to
reduce interest rate risk. Also they use forward and future contracts, swaps and options to
hedge the interest rate risk and protect its interest income margin. 
With  respect  to  the  latest  changes  in  the  The  Reserve  Bank of  India  (Amendment)  Bill
(2006),  RBI  has  legalised  all  derivatives  trading  where  at  least  one  of  the  parties  in  a
transaction is a RBI regulated entity. To start with, RBI has allowed all scheduled commercial
banks (SCBs) excluding Regional Rural Banks, primary dealers (PDs) and all-India financial
institutions to use IRS and FRA for their own balance sheet management and non-financial
corporations  to  use  IRS  and  FRA to  hedge  their  exposures,  it  provides  some  kind  of
transparency in the market and enables the regulator to assess the level of leverage from the
mandatory disclosure of the regulated entities.
3.  Data and Methodology usedin the study
3.1 Extent of derivative activity (Dependent Variable)
The  extent  of  derivative  activity  in  our  model  is  measured  by  the  notional  amount  of
derivative  contracts  which  includes  both  interest  rate  derivatives  and  foreign  currency
derivatives As suggested by Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000)
that  although  this  indicatordoes  not  measure  the  risk  of  contracts,  but  is  an  acceptable
measure of extent of involvement of banks in derivative market.
3.2 Independent Variable.
Size
Bank  size  is  the  fundamental  control  variable.  We quantify  size  with  total  assets  in  the
univariate analysis. In our regression models, we utilize the natural logarithm of aggregate
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resources, measured in millions (lntass). In the event that economies of scale or scope exist in
banks' derivatives exercises, a positive relationship ought to exist between the utilization of
derivatives by commercial banks and size as measured by total assets.Large well-diversified
banks have a lesser chance to fail than smaller banks. Total asset size also functions as a stand
by for a bank’s capacity to diversify since bigger banks have superior and diversified asset
portfolios. Asset size accounts for variations in business of small and big banks. It would
require considerable investment in capital, skill development and reputation for dealing and
trading in derivatives market which act as barriers to entry for smaller banks. Hogan and
Malmquist (1999) point out that smaller bank have higher transaction costs in using over the
counter derivatives. Large size and economies of scale allow big firms to have an advantage
when it comes to innovation in trading whereas market activities will be limited for small
banks. Hence small banks are incompetent to provide full scale risk management services and
derivative products to their customers. In this case the experimental expectation would be that
the relationship between financial derivatives is stronger for bigger banks.
Equity ratio
To  observe  the  relationship  of  equity  ratios  on  banks  decision  to  use  derivatives,  we
incorporate  the  ratio  of  equity  capital  to  total  assets.  A  positive  relationship  would
recommend  that  banks  just  utilize  derivatives  when  they  have  sufficient  capital  to  meet
administrative  prerequisites.  A  negative  connection  could  recommend  that  banks  use
derivatives  to  diminish  the  probability  of  default  when  obligation  levels  are  high  or
essentially that the utilization of derivatives is connected with a higher likelihood of default
or imaginative strategies of risk administration. Merton and Bodie (1992) point out that banks
which  adhere  to  regulatory  capital  requirements  in  banks,  have  an  ‘assurance  capital’ to
engage in various activities. According to them, assurance capital acts as a buffer during 
adverse  situation.  Jagtiani  (1996)  argues  that  higher  levels  of  capital  are  required  for
participation in the market for swaps because banks with more capital are viewed as being
more credit worthy. The same should be true for other over-the counter instruments (Carter
and  Sinkey Jr.,  1998).  However,  there  could  also  exist  an  opposite  relationship  between
relationship  between  capital  and  derivative  activities  of  banks  because  of  moral  hazard
behaviour, where banks with relatively lower capital  ratios tend to be involved in greater
derivative activities 
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Figure 1: Equity ratio of Indian Banks (2005-14)
Source: Authors own compilation
Risk Exposure (GAP) and interest rate risk 
A bank's utilization of interest rate derivatives is identified with its reaction to interest rate
changes. Despite the fact that term gap is a vital hypothetical measure of a bank's on balance
sheet interest rate risk, it is hard to gauge this factor from bank’s annual reports because of
the  absence  of  data.(e.g.,  interest  rates,  repayment  schedules,  and  so  on.).  Sinkey  and
Carter(2013), utilize gap (one year) as an intermediary for a bank's stand-in to interest rate
risk. Gap is unquestionably the estimation of the distinction between resources repricing or
maturing inside 12 months and liabilities repricing or maturing inside 12 months, scaled by
total assets.banks with a more prominent exposure to interest rate changes are relied upon to
utilize derivatives to a more prominent degree. In the event that banks are honing coordinated
risk  administration,  then  the  utilization  of  derivatives  to  fence  interest  rate  risk  may  be
identified with a bank's credit exposure
Credit Risk
We use the ratio of loan loss provisions as a measure for credit risk. In the event that banks
use derivatives (to support or estimate) as a part of their  coordinated risk management,  a
positive  relationship  is  expected  to  exist  between  loan  losses  and  derivatives  utilization.
Alternatively, a bank's credit risk exposure may have no effect on its usage of derivatives. It
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might be interesting to see the if credit risk exposure, which forms a part of on  balance sheet
risk is significant enough to make banks use derivatives or not.
Figure 2: Provisions to Total Assets for Indian Banks (2005-14)
SourceAuthor’s Compilation based on data
 Measure of profitability
Return on assets is measured by profit  after tax scaled by total  assets. In addition to Net
interest  margins,  this factor might be of significant interest  in determining the volume of
derivative use.
Alternatives to hedge
To account for alternatives to hedging, we utilize two variables: dividends (div) and asset or
stored liquidity (liquid). The previous is measured by dividends paid scaled by total assets,
while liquidity is computed by scaling a bank's liquid resources by total assets. On the off
chance  that  these  variables  reflect  alternatives  to  hedging,  banks will  be less  inclined  to
utilize derivatives to hedge as they put resources into more liquid assets and have smaller
dividend  pay-outs.  Such  banks,  nonetheless,  could  even  now  utilize  derivatives  to
hypothesize or to offer risk-administration services to customers
Figure 3: : Dividends paid as a percentage of total assets by Indian Banks (2005-14)
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Source:Author’s own compilation
Figure 4 ; Liquid resources as a percentage of total assets of Indian Banks (2005-14)
Source:Author’s own compilation
We use a dummy variable dealer which is coded as one if the bank is a member of ISDA and
zero otherwise.
Econometric Specification:
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Equation 1
Where   is the notional amount of total derivative contracts of bank i .
Credit Risk – is the on balance sheet risk components ,which are loan loss provisions to total
loans and difference between asset and liability in short term
NIM – is the intermediation profitability variable NIM
Dividends – Dividends paid to total assets
Liquidity- includes cash and marketable securities,
Size – natural logarithm for total assets,
Eqtratio - the ratio of total equity to total assets of bank i,
Dealer - Dummy variable based on whether a bank is a dealer bank or not.
 = random disturbance term
We estimate Equation 1 using a tobit model, which is an appropriate model in this context.
We notice that our data for derivatives usage is limited or censored at a point which was the
case with Tobin’s data  on household expenditures.  We empirically wish to determine the
characteristics of banks which trade in derivatives and those that do not trade in derivatives or
their derivative usage is near zero. To this end, employing ordinary least square method may
produce biased results  (Maddala ,1983),  mainly due to the fact  that values for derivative
usage  for  banks  which  do not  trade  in  derivatives   are  censored  at  zero.  Therefore,  the
appropriate methodology in this context seems to be the Tobit Model which is used in the
present paper.
We notice that the value of dependent variable which is the notional amount of derivative
contract is zero for many banks which do not use derivatives .As a result OLS estimation will
produce biased results  (Maddala,1983).If  we include the censored observation as y=0 the
observation which are censored on the left will result in the underestimation of the intercept
and overestimation of the slope.if we exclude the censored observations from the sample and
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use only the observation for which y>0 , it will lead to  overestimation of the intercept and
underestimation of the slope.The tobit model uses all the information of censored as well as
uncensored observation thereby leading to consistent estimates.The Tobit model is similar to
the classical linear regression models, except for the estimation of two additional parameters:
Equation 2
In this case if   and ,
If  then  ~ IIDN(0, σ2)
Where ,
,
,
,
The  Tobit  model  is  a  model  proposed by James  Tobin  (1958)  to  depict  the  relationship
between a non-negative dependent variable yi and an independent variable (or vector) xi. In
case of the tobit model the actual value of the dependent variable is observed if latent variable
y* is above limit .This is known as the Tobit model. The Tobit model, additionally called a
censored regression model, because some observations on y are censored. It is similar to the
classical  linear  regression models  ,  except  for  the  fact  that  it  requires  estimation  of  two
additional parameters or components..
As  it  were,  the  latent  variable  y*  is  observed  just  observed  if  y*  >  0.  Specifically,  the
dependent variable can be expressed as: y .the major uniqueness of this model
lies  in  censored  normal  distribution  of  .In  addition  to  one  normal  continuous  density
function
14
,                                                                        Equation 3
Where 
This  unique distribution also includes  a discrete  part  that  implies  to the probability that  
,
Hence, the tobit model is a combination of 2 models:
Probit model for discrete decision of whether  is 0 or positive
,
is the scale factor
Truncated regression model for continuous decision (for the quantity y,(y>0)
,
Where the expected value of is , given is positive,  is the adjustment factor as we have
truncated the sample
Similarly, we can calculate the marginal effects of each of the independent variables on , in
a censored sample. Therefore, the  coefficient  becomes,
      = ,
However  the  censored  sample  the  above  equation  will  be  adjusted  as  the  following
(Greene,1993) 
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    ,
The above equations show that a change in the independent variable can bring to effect two
types of changes : a change in the mean of the notional amount of derivative usage and also a
change in the probability of using derivatives.
Therefore, it is a combination of conditional continuous part and the conditional discrete part
with marginal effects.
It  is  otherwise  called  a  censored  regression  model  which  is  intended  to  gauge  straight
connections between variables when there is either left- or right censoring  in the dependent
variable (otherwise called editing from underneath or more, separately)
4. Data Description and Methodology
The empirical study takes place in two stages .The first stage is the estimation of the tobit
model  to  analyse  the characteristics  of banks which do and the  banks which do not  use
derivatives.In the second stage we wish to estimate whether the use of derivatives leads them
towards systematic risk or not .For the stage 2 estimation of the model we use the augmented
market model to analyse the relationship between systematic risk and derivative use.
5. Empirical results
We estimate a tobit model with our dependent variable as notional value of total derivatives
usage by banks. The total marginal effects in the model are the values which are transformed
from the MLE (maximum likelihood estimates) coefficients. The overall significance of the
model  is tested through likelihood test  .it  has a chi-square distribution with k degrees of
freedom. The overall model is significant at 1% , while the significance of each parameter is
tested  thereby  obtaining  t  ratios  and  corresponding  p-values.  The  variables  have  no
multicollinearity probelm
We also use interaction terms in our model as we find out that economies of scale do exist.
We therefore build a dummy variable for size based on total assets, as for banks with larger
value assets are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. We construct variables using interaction of size
with each independent factor.
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Table 2: Tobit estimates of regression analysis
 Model I -All banks  (NIM) Model II -  All banks (RoA)
Independent factors Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E
Provisions to total loans 0.000685 0.00648 -0.0000198  5.32E-05
Liquidity to assets 3.882515***  1.5264 3.981969***   1.508006
Dividends to assets -0.5154727 0.579696 -1.029396** 0.49801
Capital to assets 7.732232*** 1.673654 9.154982***    1.676722
GAP 0.04493 1.200459 -0.1438238    1.169246
NIM -2.161653** 0.860066
ROA -3.152017 1.041757
Dealer 4.398052*** 1.41388 3.917034***     1.36884
Ownership 2.193832*** 1.136533 0.8816633 1.220198
Constant
Log likelihood -82.669842  -81.31124  
Pseudo R-square 0.2595 0.2717
LR (chi square) 57.95 LR (chi square) 60.67
p-value 0.00000  p-value 0.0000
Our results in Model 1, show that on balance sheet credit risk is not a significant factor to
govern the use of derivatives by banks. Estimates of net interest margin indicate towards a
negative  and  significant  relationship  between  interest  spreads  and  derivative  usage.  As
(Sinkey and Carter, 2000)  point out that banks may wish to lock in their spreads by using
derivatives as means to hedge. However , our results point out that financial institutions with
low NIMs may try to build "other" income by speculating and offering derivative products
Banks associated with derivatives have significantly higher equity ratios which implies that
we  find  support  in  favour  of  assurance  capital  hypothesis  of  (Merton  and  Bodie,1989)
suggesting that banks, not having stronger capital positions ,may also invest in derivatives. 
GAP is insignificant which indicates that increase or decrease in credit and interest rate risk
may not be a driving force behind indulging in derivative activity.
Liquidity is significant at 5% with a positive sign, which indicates that it is inconsistent with
the previous hypothesis on hedging according to which lower liquidity position of a bank
may force banks to enter into derivative market. This hypothesis has previously been rejected
in various studies on US banks (Gunther and Seims, 1995).Dummy variable for ownership is
found to be significant indicating that derivative activity is relatively concentrated among
public  sector  banks  as  compared  to  private  sector  banks.Size  is  found  to  be  positively
affecting the derivative activity, and dummy variable for dealer is found to be significant at 5
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%  which  points  out,  larger  banks  with  greater  value  of  assets  are  more  likely  to  use
derivatives. It clearly indicates towards economies of scale that persist and motivates bigger
banks and hinders smaller banks from entering into the derivative market. When we replace
profitability variable by return on assets the results are almost similar and returns on assets
are found to be negatively affecting derivative usage.
Table 3: marginal effects after tobit(model I)
Independent factors Marginal effects(dy/dx)     S.E
Provisions to total loans 0.00000 0.00001
Liquidity to assets 0.7400282*** 0.28277
Dividends to assets -0.124532 0.10566
Capital to assets 1.598521*** 0.35121
GAP -0.0395138 0.21144
ROA -0.4430401** 0.22246
Size 0.1022143 0.08926
Dealer 0.4687818 0.46878
Ownership 0.2054111 0.20541
Marginal effects for varibales shown in italics represent discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.*,**,*** denote
significance at 10%,5%,1% respectively.
Table 4: estimation results (tobit model)
Model III (With interaction effect among variables)
Independent factors Coefficient S.E
Provisions to total loans 7.76E-06 0.0000419
Liquidity to assets 12.18105*** 2.261566
RoA -1.924206** 0.9876763
Dividend to assets -0.5115504 0.4630232
Ln(assets) 0.6194697* 0.5262989
Capital to assets 2.71732*** 2.151216
Ownership -0.3107782 0.9262974
GAP -1.390954 1.391874
Dealer 5.138458*** 1.188605
Size*capital 3.060681** 2.391533
Size*NIM -0.3326268* 1.766762
Size*Liquidity 1.45252*** .2564139
Size*provisions -0.176676 16.07679
Size*Gap 2.631595 2.013545
Size*Dividends -0.5268884 0.9897785
Constant -7.993013 6.532389
Log likelihood -69.707082
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%,5%,1% respectively.
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We use the estimated  β values  to  compute  elasticities  or marginal  effects  after  tobit.  We
therefore multiply the tobit estimates with the adjustment factors as given in equations above.
The  marginal  effects  after  tobit  indicate  that  on  the  condition  of  derivative  usage  being
positive,  one  percent  increase  in  the  capital  ratios  will  increase  the  derivative  usage  by
approximately  3%.  Similarly,  the  effect  of  1%  increase  of  liquidity  will  increase  the
derivative notional amount by 1.61%.Re-estimating the same model with return on assets as
the profitability  indicator  gives us similar  results.  It  points  out  that  banks with depleting
profitability may take up derivative activity to increase their profit margins. 
We find that the variable representing size is positive and significant (see table 2), which
entails us to estimate the third model based on interaction among the independent variables
with size (table 4). In this context, we first construct a dummy variable for size, which takes
the value 1 if the total value of assets of a bank is greater than the median value of all the
banks  taken  together  and  then  build  interaction  variables  by  multiplying  each  of  the
independent variable with the size based dummy. The results are given Table no.2
Table 3 : Marginal effects after Tobit(model III)
Model III (With interaction effect among variables)
Independent factors Coeffecient S.E
Provisions to total loans 7.76E-06 0.0000419
Liquidity to assets 12.18105*** 2.261566
RoA -1.924206** 0.9876763
Dividend to assets -0.5115504 0.4630232
Ln(assets) 0.6194697* 0.5262989
Capital to assets 2.71732*** 2.151216
Ownership -0.3107782 0.9262974
GAP -1.390954 1.391874
Dealer 5.138458*** 1.188605
Size*capital 3.060681** 2.391533
Size*NIM -0.3326268* 1.766762
Size*Liquidity 1.45252*** .2564139
Size*provisions -0.176676 16.07679
Size*Gap 2.631595 2.013545
Size*Dividends -0.5268884 0.9897785
Constant -7.993013 6.532389
Log likelihood -69.707082
Pseudo R-Square 0.3756
LR statistic(chi-sq) 83.88
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p-value 0.0000
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%,5%,1% respectively.
The results of model III (table 4) indicate that larger banks with lesser interest margins have
higher investments in derivatives. The interaction term between large banks and credit risk is
insignificant  .We also find evidence  in  favour  of  derivative  activity  in  larger  banks with
higher liquidity. Similarly, larger banks with higher capital ratios have higher incentives for
derivative activity.
It may be mentioned that the for tobit the R- squared value is the square of the correlation
coefficient between  and the expected  values.Based upon R square measure , it can be
said that the Tobit conditional mean function fits the derivative data nicely. It may be recalled
here that Tobit estimation will not maximise R square as in OLS, they will maximise the log-
likelihood function.
The above table 5 depicts  the marginal effects after the tobit  estimation of variables with
interaction effects it may be concluded that for larger banks, higher capital ratios and higher
liquidity will lead to an increase in derivative activity. Precisely, 1% increase capital of larger
banks will increase their derivative use by 0.72%.The major result of this analysis supports
the fact  that  financial  derivatives  are used to  hedge against  interest  rate  risk.  Our results
majorly indicate that lower the bank’s exposure to interest rate risk (measured by NIM), it is
more likely that the banks will use derivatives.
The analysis has given us an insight about  the on balance sheet factors that govern derivative
usage .In the next stage we wish to determine the impact of derivative use on the systematic
risk of the banks.
6. Section II:
Derivatives are complicated assets, and many characteristics of these relatively new assets
have been evolving day by day. The fast growth of bank involvement in  derivative markets
has  raised  concerns  about  the  potential  hazards  of  this  activity.On  the  flipside,  certain
characteristics of derivatices makes them highly useful in hedging risks.
In  this  section,  we examine  the  impact  derivative  activity  on  the  systematic  risk  of  the
publicly listed on sample of Indian banks for the year 2013. In previous section, we analysed
the various balance sheet components to determine the determinants of derivative usage in
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India .However, we wish to examine whether the usage of derivatives exposes banks towards
further risks. Using an augmented market model, we categorically measure the exposures of
banks to interest rate and exchange rate risk. Thereby, we first estimate the exchange rate,
interest rate sensitivity of equity returns of the listed sample, we then analyse that whether the
use of derivatives is related to risk exposures of banks towards systematic exchange rate risk
and interest rate risk exposures.
We collect  data  on  notional  amount  of  interest  rate  contracts  and  the  notional  value  of
currency derivatives separately .Off balance sheet data is extracted from Bloomberg based on
weekly stock prices of publicly traded Indian banks .To estimate the exposures for 2013 we
use a three  year  estimation  window as  mentioned in  previous studies.So to  calculate  the
exposures for 2013 we collect weekly data from March 2010 to March 2013 
To incorporate the interest rate exposure (both long term and short term) and the exchange
rate exposures we employ an augmented market model. To estimate the exposure of a bank
from the augmented market model, for the year 2013, we use weekly data of the following:
Returns of the stock price of bank, returns on closing value of Bankex1, from March 2010 to
March 2013 to estimate the exposures in 20132 and then use them in the following time series
regression(augmented market model).This model is widely used in investigating the banks
market , interest rate and exchange rate exposures ( Choi and Elyasiani,1997).
Equation 4
 is the rate of return on ith banks’s stock at time t
Bankex- is the rate of return on the market portfolio at time t
LTexp-is the long term interest rate on Governement Bond index
STexp-is the short term or 3 month T-bill rate 
1Bankex-The BSE bankex index comprises the constituents of the BSE 500 that are classified as members of the
banking sector .
2It has been shown in literature that the estimation window of 3 to 5 years is a good approximation of interest 
rate and exchange rate exposures
21
Exchrt- is the rate of change of  INR against USD
To increase the accuracy of our estimations in this model we use the method proposed by
Doidge et al. (2006) wherein the coefficients are standardised by the standard error as a few
sample banks do not have a considerable exposure to interest rates in the regression model.
An advantage of this method is that the betas estimated are more precise and they receive a
heavier weight while entering the regression. 
Equation 5
Equation 6
jiX  are the bank specific  control  variables  which include  equity ratios ,bank size,  dealer
status and ownership.
jiY  is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives if bank i’s for year 2013
jiA  are the are the bank specific control variables which include equity ratios ,bank size,
dealer status and ownership.
jiB  are the notional amount of currency derivatives for the year 2013
We hypothesise  the  relationship  of  the  systemetic  exchange  rate  risk   and  interest  rate
exposure with the use of currency derivatives as well interest rate derivatives respectively. 
Table 4 :estimation results
Dependent Risk variable: Exchange rate exposure Long term interest rate exposure
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Constant -0.511822 1.131984 0.62936 1.306982
Ownership 0.222675 0.212299 -0.188069 0.245119
Size 0.002757 0.090639 -0.038375 0.104652
Derivative volume -0.968828*** 0.374822 -0.923322** 0.432767
Capital to Assets 1.308432** 0.506978 0.920849* 0.585354
 R squared 0.251289  0.28809  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.068293  0.004706  
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%,5%,1% respectively.
The empirical analysis of Equation shows that there exists a negative relationship between
exchange  rate  risk  and  derivative  use.  Higher  the  derivative  activity  lesser  will  be  the
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exchange rate exposure risk.Long term interest rate risk exposure has been estimated susing
the standard augmented market  model  baseline equation.  The results  provide some useful
insights when we replace the dependent variable by long term interest rate risk exposure .We
document the evidence for a significant negative relationship in the interest rate risk exposure
of banks as a result of the derivative activity. It may be noted that banks are effectively using
derivatives to hedge against interest rate risk .This seems to be an important implication in
light of the usage of derivatives by banks to hedge risk .It also indicates towards successful
hedging of interest rate risk by banks with use of derivatives.
7. Concluding Remarks.
The rationale for the use of derivatives is well established; that for banks and other financial
institutions  less.  Regulators  and  bankers  are  most  concerned  about  the  banks  which  are
actively involved in derivative activities. The paper contributes to the existing literature by
providing empirical evidence on Indian banks derivative activities. In this study, we analyze
the  underlying  factors  that  govern  the  decision  regarding  the  use  of  derivatives  .Various
determinants are identified which form the basis for  participation and volume decisions for
currency and interest rate derivatives. Our results indicate that bank-specific characteristics
do  influence  participation.  As  with  other  studies,  we  find  that  the  propensity  to  use
derivatives  is  positively  related  to  bank  size  and  membership  as  a  primary  dealer  of
derivatives,  liquidity  and  capital  ratio.  These  findings  suggest  scale  and  informational
economies  and  primary  dealer  advantage,  which  cannot  be  easily  offset  by  alternative
strategies,  increase the need for off-balance-sheet hedging.  We also find evidence for the
assurance capital hypothesis that equity ratio, acting as proxy for debt level/ leverage, has an
effect on derivatives activity. It may be suggested that a positive association between capital
to asset ratio and derivative usage highlights that both regulators as well market discipline
have been successful in warranting the use of derivatives by large well-capitalised banks
We also find some support for the motivations given in the literature for risk management
using derivatives. In addition, we find strong support for the arguments that banks with lesser
NIM are  highly  active  in  derivatives  market.  Alternatively,  banks  with  lesser  spreads  or
duration  mismatches  try  to  build  in  their  spreads  and  other  income  by  using  hedging
instruments in the derivative market. Some on-balance-sheet hedging instruments, such as the
diversification of loan portfolio, serve as alternatives to reduce bank risks.  There is strong
support for argument that large size banks are more likely to trade in derivative markets. It is
because there is a fixed cost associated with initial participation on derivative usage. This
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again highlights the cost-based incentives to use derivatives. Ownership is also found to be
positively significant suggesting that public sector banks have greater derivative activity as
compared to private sector banks.
Further, the question of the impact of derivative use on riskiness of  banks is interesting to
investigate. We need to assess whether the banks riskiness depends upon derivative use or
not. In order to document the effect of extent of derivative activity on off balance sheet risk
exposures we use an augmented market model to calculate the systematic risk exposures of
banks for the year 2013 .The results point towards a significant decrease in exchange rate
riskiness using derivatives as well as a significant decline in the long term interest risk using
derivatives. It implies and motivates banks to indulge in derivative trading, as the systemic
risks do not seem to be potentially aggravated by using them and derivative activity may be
concentrated among well capitalised banks which can safely manage risks.
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